

The Effects of Domestic versus Europeanization Influences on Intergovernmental Relations: The Case of Spain

Robert Agranoff
School of Public and Environmental Affairs
Indiana University-Bloomington, USA
Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset
Madrid, Spain
agranoff@indiana.edu

Xavier Ballart
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, Madrid
xavier.ballart@uab.es

Robert Agranoff is Professor Emeritus, Indiana University-Bloomington, and since 1990 has been affiliated with the Government and Public Administration Program, Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset. His recent work includes *Managing Within Networks* (Georgetown 2007) and *Local Governments' Intergovernmental Relations in Federalizing Spain* (McGill-Queen's, in press).

Xavier Ballart is Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Autònoma University of Barcelona. He is co-author of *Ciencia de la Administración* (Triantlo Blanch 2000).

Abstract

In many policy areas Spanish intergovernmental relations (IGR) demonstrate more competitive than cooperative practices. Europeanization has had some influences on regional cooperation, particularly in areas of high integration, e.g. agriculture and fishing, whereas other areas like economic development and universities display more of a Spanish competitive IGR model. Employing data from the Spanish government and examples of decision making we find that in many domestic arenas an IGR model that emphasizes bilateral vertical interaction, poor multilateral horizontal relations, and weak second chamber induced regional cooperation.

The Effects of Domestic versus Europeanization Influences on Intergovernmental Relations: the case of Spain.

Introduction

Europeanization is a phenomenon that is used to explain changes of different kinds on European Union member states. It is reasonable to think that Europe has an influence on the domestic level and that European processes create new opportunities for all kinds of political actors which will try to maximize their outcomes developing strategies within changing conditions set by the EU. By the same token, internal forces may make European influences problematic in the face of long-standing internal forces. This is less well understood. We explore these latter processes with regard to Spain.

The debates on European integration and European governance are closely related to Europeanization. The emergence of “Europeanized” policy fields, processes and politics has contributed to make Europeanization itself a phenomenon that various theories try to explain (Bulmer 2007). But Europeanization is not easy to measure or quantify and there is clearly the risk of attributing to Europe changes that may be a result of domestic political processes, particularly internal intergovernmental relations.

The basic reference with regard to this issue is Olsen’s distinction between five forms of Europeanization. Two of them refer to the extension of European policies, models and policy instruments, institutional arrangements, rules and norms inside or beyond the EU. Two others are related to building European capacity at the centre, and the final one refers to the “penetration of national systems of governance.” This last

form of Europeanization is of the greatest relevance here. It suggests that EU membership may have an effect, not only on policy but also on political processes and on member states' politics and policy. Europeanization could therefore change institutional structures and patterns of behavior transforming the relations between various types and levels of government units. This has been raised most frequently concerning federal or federalizing European countries as evidence that this happens with regard to their intergovernmental relations (IGR) (Börzel 2000).

This is an interesting question to study. To what extent does Europeanization happen? Does membership in the EU change a country's intergovernmental institutions and processes? In what direction(s)? Is there a European convergence process that makes federal and regionally decentralized countries more similar in "Europeanized" fields? Or does European influence consolidate existing IGR differences that already exist within a country, that is within the existing patterns of relations between various levels of government?

We develop this research question looking for evidence of changes on both directions in the evolution of intergovernmental relations in Spain. Krane and Wright (1998) define intergovernmental relations as "the various combinations of interdependencies and influences among public officials – elected and administrative – in all types and levels of governmental units." More recently Agranoff (2009) has expanded this definition to include the development and management of networks involving government actors and programs with nongovernmental actors in a variety of contractual and fiscal subvention activities that develop and implement programs of intermediate and central governments. We explore evidence of changes in the relations

that are the consequence of EU processes, and conversely domestic influences, particularly in “Europeanized” fields.

According to this view, European induced changes could bring Spain closer to the dynamics of other European federal countries in the way institutions, political parties and governments work, solve their differences and make decisions concerning policies. This was seen by Börzel (1999, 2000, 2002) who argued in favor of a change from “competitive” regionalism to “cooperative” federalism in Spain. Other authors have seen Spain on a “federalization” path (Agranoff, 1993, 1996, 2004; Agranoff and Ramos, 1997; Moreno, 1999; Grau, 2001; Maiz *et al.* 2002) but have not particularly identified a change of IGR model toward dominant cooperative models.

This latter view suggests that it is also possible that the European influence was not strong enough to change a pattern of relations between political actors forged during the last thirty years of Spanish decentralization. Those relations are conditioned by the institutional structures set up by the Constitution which gives a leading and controlling role to the central government in any initiative involving various autonomous communities. Relations are also affected by a style of decision making that is characteristic of Spanish politics where local and regional political parties tend to negotiate in a rather corporatist fashion with social actors and their partners in the center through the political parties and strong first minister and cabinet systems at the central and regional levels.

Employing both data collected by the Spanish government and non data in the form of examples from the authors research (Agranoff 2007; Agranoff 1999; Ballart y

Ramio 2000) illustrate the making of decisions in Spain. The main finding is that, fifteen years after the initial reforms with regard to the representation of autonomous communities in European affairs, it cannot be argued that the basic characteristics of the relations between tiers of government, autonomous communities and political parties have changed in any significant matter. While there are clearly distinct influences of Europeanization, we argue that the Spanish intergovernmental system did not become more similar to those of other federal European countries and rather appears to consolidate the existing the pattern of Spanish IGR. We suggest this as an alternative hypothesis.

As a result, there appears to be a need for more cautious conclusions regarding the effects of Europeanization and the effects of external influences on deeply rooted processes. It could be that the “penetration of national systems of governance” would be limited to a few institutional reforms that have opened up new opportunities for autonomous communities to be present at the European level but may not change the style and characteristics of relations between them or between them and the central government.

European integration and a power division in compound member states

European integration theory has debated the effects of constructing the European system of governance for a long time (Moravcsik, 1994; Sandholtz, 1996; Marks et al, 1996, Kohler-Koch, 1996: Kohler-Koch and Eising, 2000). Some authors expressed similar concerns under the label of “Europeanization” seen as the phenomenon by which European integration induces changes in domestic institutions and policies

(Olsen, 2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; Graziano and Vink, 2007). Most of these studies take a top down perspective. They understand the European system of governance in hierarchical terms since they judge transformational processes at the domestic level to adapt to the supranational level.

A smaller number of analysts argue the need to also look at mutual influences due to intergovernmental traditions. The common assumption is that those elements of the political systems that are more differential with the European context will transform themselves. More specifically, federal or federalizing countries, should experience changes in both vertical and horizontal relations between national governments, regions and other political actors to adapt to European rules, decision making and policies. According to some authors (Risse et al. 2001; Börzel, 2002) this is what happened in the case of Germany and Spain. They explain how in these countries regions were confronted with losses in policy making, public finances and management capacity due to European integration which were the cause of political pressure to rebalance the distribution of competencies and resources with the central state. With the expansion of the EU, central governments had developed a role as main interpreters of national interests in areas that did not correspond to them. The “misfit” or incompatibility between European rules and processes and the institutional structure of compound member states (Loughlin, 2000) made necessary to create new mechanisms to increase the participation of regions in European affairs. However, this was expected to be easier for Germany than for Spain since the tradition of cooperative federalism in the first case provided a culture of multilateral bargaining and consensus building that made things

easier. While in the second case, the tradition was based on conflict and lack of cooperation.

According to other authors (Bulmer, 2007) there is another form of Europeanization which takes place when the institutional solutions applied in one country are exported to another country. Bulmer refers to this form of isomorphic transmission of ideas and rules within Europe as a form of “horizontal, intra-EU Europeanization.” As will be explained below, Spain actually did introduce a few institutional mechanisms that had been applied in Germany to provide for regional interest representation in European affairs, including a multilateral commission – Conference for European Affairs or CARCE - to allow the discussion between all the regions and the central government of European affairs, participation of regional representatives in the Spanish Permanent Representation in various EU working groups, and in 2004 in the European Council on the basis of a rotation between autonomous communities (CARCE, 2004). These changes are evidence of adaptation to European decision making and processes. They are more or less in those areas where Europe demands that each country has one position or plan with regard to a certain policy arena. It would be impossible for any plural state to work without some sort of multilateral procedure to reach a consensus.

But if Europeanization is supposed to mean more than the isomorphic transmission of institutional reforms, then there should be a radical transformation in the intergovernmental model and in the vertical and horizontal relations between national governments, regions and other political actors (Table 1). In the case of Spain, which is particularly interesting given the stronger need to change, we should see a journey from

model A to model B where model A is characterized by an uncompromising behavior and power struggles between the central government and regions that are resolved through bilateral-vertical relations; and model B is characterized by a cooperative behavior where regions have much more capacity to work along the horizontal regional axis, reach consensus and defend their common positions in front of the federation.

Table 1
Models of Transformation

Model A		Model B	
Vertical Cooperation State-Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes, Bilateral ▪ Poor Multilateral 	Vertical Cooperation State-Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No, Bilateral ▪ Yes, Multilateral
Horizontal Cooperation Between Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No Bilateral ▪ No Multilateral 	Horizontal Cooperation Between Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes Bilateral ▪ Yes Multilateral
Strength of cooperation Regions – 2nd Chamber	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak 	Strength of cooperation Regions– 2nd Chamber	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong

The main characteristic of model A is the vertical relations between the central state and individual regions through bilateral negotiations and agreements. Changing to a model B is not simple since it requires the development of the capacity of regions to work together independently of the central state, and, at the same time, with the central state in the search for common ground as a basis for joint action. These developments are

also dependent on constitutional choices involving the role and functions of institutions like second chambers that directly represent regional interests.

The basic problem with regard to changes in intergovernmental relations is that the rhetoric of collaboration and the spirit of partnership is difficult to contrast with the realities of intergovernmental cooperation. It is not easy to conceptually distinguish between a “competitive” and a “cooperative” behavior since there is always a degree of competition and conflict in intergovernmental relations (Kincaid, 1991) and cooperation is a voluntary action that may be temporary since there is always the option of conflict.

Therefore, it is more reasonable to examine whether there is a trajectory of structural reforms and review of the relationships among central and regional governments. This can be observed if there is:

- increasing consultation of regions by the central government on major issues;
- increasing cooperation among regional governments;
- new forms of cooperation of the second chamber with regional executives

Those changes can have an impact in the whole system of intergovernmental relations or they can affect more intensively those areas that are more directly influenced by European rules and processes.

The baseline: European Union involvement and the characteristics of Spanish intergovernmental relations

The main trait of the Spanish case is the competitive and individualistic nature of its intergovernmental relations. Together with Belgium, Spain is seen by the literature as the European case model of decentralization with a strong political pressure at the base. Two of the historic nationalities, Basque and Catalan, pushed to maximize their powers, including symbolic issues, while the state followed the same strategy in the opposite direction, trying to avoid new transferences and any increase in the financing of services. In the Spanish case, other regions followed the same pattern asking for the same powers and resources that the two “pioneers” could get, which consolidated a path for the relations between the autonomous communities and the state. Indeed, this broadening of powers has been the way the central government has managed asymmetrical federalism—to swing back toward symmetry (Agranoff 1999). As a result, there is a “path dependency” argument that explains the nature of intergovernmental relations but there are also alternative explanations that can be based on organizational, institutional arguments or the cultural characteristics of Spanish politics.

The Path of Spanish IGR Development

Along with any Europeanization influences IGR has evolved rather rapidly since the Constitution of 1978. A multitiered system was developed to territorially organize the state into autonomous communities, provinces, and municipalities along with special units of government of a horizontal (*mancomunidad*) and vertical (*consortia*) nature, plus the usual government corporations, and contract relations with the non-public sector. As is the case in many other countries (Agranoff 2009), IGR in Spain rapidly transformed itself through four phases.

The first was a phase of legal institution-building, where general constitutional norms, the adoption of regional statutes of autonomy, central legislation transferring and enforcing regional powers, various political agreements, interpretation of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the orientation of the political parties all built a system that was federal in all but name (Aja 2003: 95). Most important for our purposes were several Constitutional Tribunal decisions that undergirded the autonomy of regional governments yet reinforced the shared power nature of the two levels of government in the face of devolved competencies, and outlined a transfer of programs process that required bilateral central-residual commissions, program by program, community by community. This mixed central-regional involvement meant that programs like local government control was considered to be *bifronte* as set down by the court in STC84/1982 (see Márquez 2007, Ch. 1). This led to enactment of local government framework laws, passed in 1985 and 1988 by the central government and subsequently amended, but now under the oversight of the regional governments. It was a period that established the constitutionally inspired character of all governments as “jurisdictional,” that is possessing independent being in relation to other units.

A second, almost simultaneous phase occurred as Spain attempted to catch up to other European countries while building its welfare state. Over the long haul, this proved to be an aspect of IGR that had both European and internal influences. The latter can best be illustrated by the building of public health and medical services, public education and the universities system, and various aspects of social services, physical infrastructure provision, and regulation of land. In each of these cases a condition of welfare state interdependency was created by Spanish governing processes that included

a *bifronte* national normative framework with shared legal autonomous community responsibility along with control over implementation (Argullot et. al 2004). This, as will be demonstrated, established a pattern of bilateral contacts between levels of governments over what one might conclude would be the “core” of domestic government. As these systems were being built internally, so to speak, politics and government occurred largely outside of European influence. Later, Europeanization did influence established programs in such areas as employment policy, environment, worker health and safety, agriculture, fishing, and later immigration. They clearly made their imprint on Spain, both through a dedicated set of mechanisms (e.g. CARCE) and through the central-regional-local program implementation process. Nevertheless, a number of observers of European Union processes have concluded that “Spain’s membership of the European Union has reinforced existing tendencies in intergovernmental relations” (Closa and Heywood 2004: 102), sometimes by internally demonstrating cooperation but also by confrontation and competition (Colino 2001). We will see that whichever pattern is followed, a status of interunit interdependency was created as a result of the expanding Spanish welfare state (Moreno 2003).

A third IGR force that is less visible but equally of importance is the connection between government and non-governmental institutions in Spain. In the education field private schools, particularly those run by the Catholic Church and non-sectarian independents, are subsidized by government grants but regulated by central and regional norms. Central-regional funded social services in the cities are contracted out to nonprofits, with the most prominent being Catholic Charities and the Red Cross. Many immigrant settlement programs are funded by contract to local nationality group associations. Municipal services are contracted virtually everywhere in Spain,

particularly in refuse collection/recycling/disposal, water supply plus a host of procurement activities. This means that IGR extends out to the nongovernmental organization sectoral, creating “at the source” bilateral arrangements between the contractor and the government, adding new actors to the mix (Bel and Costas 2006).

A fourth and emergent phase of IGR involves visible efforts to build networks of governmental and non-governmental actors that approach the most difficult problems that no one agency or level of government has responsibility for or can solve. These “structures of independence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical management” (O’Toole 1997: 45) attempt to bridge the complexity of government and non-government organization now involved in programming. Actually, Spain has experienced a form of these networks with its vertical *consortia*, (over 900 in 2005), particularly in the areas of economic development, water supply, refuse collection, cultural promotion, theater management, hospital management, public works, and promotion of tourism. They are most prevalent between sets of municipalities, and provinces, but are known to include regional and central governments (Font, Gutiérrez and Parrado 1999). Also emerging are networks of regional and local government actors and non-governmental organizations who deal with problems that are generated by European Union or other supranational actions, for example in the settling of immigrants, environmental planning and programming, land use preservation, and long-term employment/economic development. Many of these networks include citizen participation and operate on two dimensions, horizontally with multiple local actors and vertically through articulation of thematic issues to influence higher level governments (Blanco y Goma 2002: 26).

b. Organizational reasons

The organization of the transference of services and resources to the autonomous communities required some coordination given the material need of a smooth transition in the management of services. Early in the process, the transfer of powers process was set by Constitutional Tribunal rule that negotiations be individualized. They are organized through a continuing system of bilateral commissions where the state and each of the seventeen regions meet and transfer power individually, competency by competency. Ramos (2006: 123) reports that since 2001 a total of 19 such commissions were organized (one per region plus 2 territories in North Africa), with the number of meetings ranging between two and 13 per commission. This process of two-party haggling over regulations, costs and services set a tone of one against one that extended over all matters from 1981, when the first was organized, until the present since the process continues. Hundred of transactions on programs and their finances are negotiated yearly between individual regions and the central government. As the frequency data below suggests, bilateral commissions are primary functions within Spanish IGR.

This process has reinforced individualism and bilateralism in Spanish intergovernmental relations for almost thirty years now (Aja, 1999; García, 2006; González 2006). Both, the state and autonomous communities prefer to negotiate directly and search for solutions through their political parties, whether it is the two major ones, PSOE and PP, when they both have the central and the regional government, or through nationalist or regionalist political parties when they are in

control in their autonomous communities and the central government exchanges the transfer of resources and new competencies for their support in the Parliament – in 1993, the PSOE, in 1996, the PP, in 2004 and 2008 the PSOE, particularly at budget enactment time.


c. Institutional reasons

There are also institutional reasons that explain the tendency favoring the uncoordinated competitive bilateral dynamics or that become an obstacle to a change in the style of intergovernmental relations. First, the two main national parties tried at various times to pass legislation to “harmonize the autonomic process” and break with the unequal development of the autonomous communities, but this legislation was either declared unconstitutional – a PSOE initiative in 1982 known as “*Ley del Proceso Autonómico*” - or did not reach a sufficient majority in Parliament in 2000 – a PP initiative in 2000. They did reach agreements to equalize the powers of the ten autonomous communities that were slower in their development of autonomy in 1992 – II Autonomic Agreements - and in 2000 when the central government imposed that all regions had to manage education and health.

In addition, since 1981 around thirty “sectoral conferences” have been created in both Europeanized and non Europeanized areas (MAP, 2008c). These conferences are relatively popular because they are almost always accompanied with grant funds of some type. Alda (2006: 138-139) reports that of around 60-70 sectoral conferences per year, less than 10 (range three to eight) went with European financing with the rest funded by the Spanish central government. The increase in the number of conferences

and in the number of annual meetings, as shown in Table 2, can be interpreted as an indicator of increasing multilateral cooperation. But importantly, conferences have no power to enforce policies or regulations and they may not be called by the central government or attended by the regional representatives (Xavier: this sentence unclear). Their dynamics are again very much influenced by personal (minister) and political factors (relations between main political parties and with regional political parties).

Table 2
Total number of “sectoral conferences” 1981-2007



Source of data: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations

d. IGR and the European Union

In the most important manner of any non-central government competency, exclusive policy and program issues EU affairs are regional affairs through the AC governments. At one time it was felt that central governments were the most active “upstream” representatives with regard to policymaking and regions where the “downstream” actors in implementation. Time has eroded this distinction in many

countries, including Spain. While at an earlier point in Spain's development the central government played the upperhand in making policy and then in informing the regions, by the mid-1990s the AC began taking more of a proactive role. Rachel Jones (1997: 20) concludes that since the opening of discussions regarding structural funds reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s "direct dialogue between regional authorities and EU institutions and a greater regional input into the policy process" has made policy development a two-level game.

The Constitutional Tribunal has gradually approved increased AC international activity, so long as it does not compromise the unity of Spanish foreign policy and its exclusive treaty powers under Article 149.1.3 (along with Articles 56.1, 63.2, 94.1 and 97). For example, the Constitutional Tribunal upheld Catalonia's right to promote its cultural practices and values outside Spain, so long as these efforts did not compromise national sovereignty nor generated state responsibilities with other parties. In a 1995 case upholding Basque representation and an EU office in Brussels, the court concluded that a rigid and expansive concept of exclusive jurisdiction in Article 149.1.3 meant denying ACs any possibility of carrying out activities that, despite some international dimension, did not imply exercising sovereignty; nor did they create international obligations, generate responsibilities of the state to others, or affect the state's foreign policy (Garcia 1995: 126). In effect, the court was saying that to deny such activity would prevent ACs from carrying out those activities necessary to achieve their objectives within the framework of power devolved to them. On the other hand, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal has maintained that EU law lacks constitutional standing, but does recognize the supremacy of Community law over domestic law at an "infra-constitutional level" (Closa and Heywood 2004: 79). Thus binds judges to

Spanish law first and the Tribunal does not see itself as an interpreter of EU law; that belongs to Spain's normal courts.

Closa and Heywood's (2004: Ch. 4) study of Spain's role in the EU identify several important AC responses to EU involvement. First, almost all ACs have adopted organization models that include subdirectorates with a focus on EU affairs, interdepartmental bodies dedicated to formulating EU policy and orientation, and interministerial coordination mechanisms to promote regional responses.

Second, because of limited legislative influence, only a few AC parliaments have standing EU committees or regularly debate EU related development plans.

Third, and more important, virtually all of the 17 ACs have lobbying offices in Brussels that: exchange information, promote regional interests and concerns, support regional activities (most important, attending Committee of Regions), support and advise EU institutions on regional matters and participate in consultative committees. Also, these regional representatives (offices can have up to 40 staff and spend one-half million euros) participate in those Spanish EU projects (around one-fourth) that are submitted by regions.

Fourth, is regional and local representation on the Committee of Regions, 21 elected officials, 17 of whom are from ACs and four nominated by the local government association FEMP. While a consultative body, the committee has circumvented its lack of formal powers by allying itself with the European Commission in that the latter recognizes the former as most important in policy implementation (Sariqi 2005: 7).

Fifth, is involvement of ACs in inter-regional associations, particularly the Association of European Regions, and specialized associations such as the High-technology Route that includes Catalonia and Valencia and the *Arco-Atlántico* that unites coastal regions, including four in Spain. Many of these bodies are said to have exceeded EU Commission hopes in promoting trans-frontier cooperation (Closa and Heywood 2004: 91). Each of these activities tend to be organized by individual Acs rather than as any form of unified effort.

Inside Spain several mechanisms also attend to sub-national affairs. First, is the previously identified Conference for EU Affairs (CARCE), established after years of protracted negotiations. Chaired by the Minister of Public Administration, includes the Secretaries of State for EU and for Territorial Administration and one representative nominated by each AC president. CARCE tries to reinforce the state role in EU policy-making and its oversight in implementation but recognizes the role of subnational governments regarding their arenas of competency. It has attempted to become a venue for exchange of information and joint discussions on EU matters, coordinating the outcomes of sectoral conferences, dealing with any issues not under the purview of the sectoral conferences. It also strives for horizontal coordination but this has proved elusive, given to territorial diversity.

A second domestic vehicle are the 17 EU related sectoral conferences themselves. Set up in key policy areas, they have no power or ability to enforce policies or regulations. They are heavily dependent on State power, and most have no real fixed pattern of operation, despite regularly scheduled meetings. A number have met less than

five times since 1987. Many of them are reported as poorly attended by the ACs, (ten of the 17 average less than one representative per AC for each meeting). Non-attendance is particularly high by Basque and Catalan representatives (Gonzalez, 2006: 108-109). Spanish observers agree that sectoral conferences have not been an effective means to channel cooperation (Colomer, 1998; Aja 1999, López Aranguren 2002, Maiz et. al. 2002; Gonzalez 2006, García Montilla y Arbós 2006).

Third, the more aggressive regions, particularly the Basque Country and Catalonia, have set up bilateral commissions, reinforcing the competitive nature of IGR. They, in effect, bypass CARCE and the sectoral conferences, and contain many high-level state and AC *committee* officials. They are generally designed to avoid conflict in implementation, and in the case of Catalonia is part of their broader strategy at supporting unilateral initiatives, bargaining with the central government, and promoting interregional cooperation.

Fourth, since 1996, the central government agreed to two additional measures: the appointment of AC representatives to Spain's Permanent Representation (REPER) and to EU Commission committees and working groups. This representation function is in close relation to AC offices in Brussels. AC representatives were subsequently added to over 50 EU committees, most importantly those involved in the various fund allocations.

Fifth, and finally, the Spanish Senate's General Commission for the Autonomous Communities is a standing committee of 62, half nominated by AC parliaments. It receives information from the central government on EU rules with

regional implications, develops criteria for Spanish representation on international bodies that involve ACs (e.g. Committee of Regions) and monitors the receipt and distribution of EU structural funds. Through its subcommittees, it has generated many reports on the existing and future roles of the ACs within the EU (Closa and Heywood 93-97). It is important to mention that the Spanish Senate does not have the same kind of power as that of the German Bundestag in negotiations. Electorally, it is a very weak body of AC representation.

In conclusion, the issues between AC and Madrid become complex where the state level sets policy and the AC implements. While the EU has considerable influence with regard to emergent policy areas like environmental policy and newer arenas of EU policy development, such as gender equality, telecommunications, immigration and work force roles they nevertheless exhibit great levels of multigovernmental complexity. Cesar Colino's (2007: 53) recent assessment of AC/center EU politics concludes that the central government continues to maintain state centered controls, despite court rulings that ACs can become involved in their areas of competency, by bureaucratic inertia and its slowdowns over the various instruments exercised. This fans the flames of bilateralism, particularly among the more nationalistic and/or stronger regions. When there is resistance, it is in these areas of AC involvement that ordinary, that is, competitive IGR prevails and multilateral relations remain weak. At any moment, the central minister can call for a "sectoral conference" with the corresponding regional ministers but it is him or her who decides the topics that will be discussed and it is his or her central ministry the one in charge of organizing the meeting. There are also a number of councils in matters where the function of coordination is given to the state by the Constitution: economic planning, research, and health. Some of the conferences and

councils meet more regularly and may be useful to exchange information but they normally do not work as joint decision makers in all of the EU policy instances.

e. Political culture

Cultural issues that affect Spanish politics is a matter that has received considerable attention in the literature (Carr and Fusi 1981; Jimenez 1999; Wiarda 1993). Most important here is that there is a corporatist tradition in Spanish politics which makes bilateral or trilateral bargaining an important means of decision making (Agranoff, 2007). Going back to the 19th Century, interests of different kinds take their issues directly to the central government. Labor management relations are normally between the state, large companies and the two major labor federations. Unions and management do not normally bargain. Both do with the state. Regional and local interests are also the object of intense bargaining between the state, regional or local governments, private interests and project leaders. To a certain degree, programs of AC competency have been pushed down the line to AC-local relations, but they are more or less corporatist on a smaller/localized scale.

The relations between political actors are often personalized and individualistic. The idea of contacting the right person in the right position is relevant. In Spain it is called *enchufe*, to be “plugged in” to the right source. Since political parties are strong, party or intraparty contacts are therefore more prevalent and more important than any form of collective bargaining.

The two major statewide political parties are federated. They tend to be controlled from the top on central issues but with important regional barons who control sub-national party machinery and issues. National and regional political parties in control of their respective parliaments are the object of lobbying and decision influence.

As a country of dual loyalties and multiple identities of varying intensity, the sub-national push is for power and resources rather than cooperation and solidarity (Moreno 2001). Loyalties to the regional interests are not exclusive of the historic nationalities, Catalan, Basque or Galician. As a consequence of the decentralization process, Andalucía, Canarias, Valencia and others also weigh loyalty to the general interest with a need to defend their regional best interests. This in particular relates to those competencies delegated downward in welfare states, economic development and environmental issues where EU influences are filtered through the state.

Based on these traits of Spanish political culture, intergovernmental relations take place through a variety of means beyond formal bodies of consultation: in the first place the power of regional interests is used to forge the best deal possible through direct negotiations with the political party in power in Madrid. When one of the two main political parties in power is in a minority government and needs the parliamentary support of the non-state nationalist parties, the latter's power is magnified. This is what happened with the Catalan party Convergence and Union (CiU) which was able to leverage new concessions on two occasions during the 90s. This two party agreement route during minority governments has been the primary strategy for the Catalans and Basques, who have traditionally lead the battle with Madrid over the three major categories of contention: transfers of power, resources and a role in the European scene.

Second, the main political parties in the central government have also taken the lead to forge major multiparty agreements. This second mode of intergovernmental relations requires enlisting the major minority party or the larger non-state parties to reach agreements on principles of state-regional relations or on other matters. There have been major agreements on power transfers, tax sharing and finances. However, on some occasions the minority party refused to join with the majority party despite the agreement of the other smaller parties. This happened in 2006 with a state pact on breaking down ETA violence. Multilateral agreements come very slowly and are almost never negotiated with a unified regional front. There is rarely a pre-agreement process among regions on the negotiating process or its outcomes.

Third, in their actions as they carry out the competencies, regions also have individual contacts up or down the line. These amount to a series of bilateral political and administrative transactions. In some areas like urban planning, virtually all local government contact is between local and regional governments. In areas of shared competencies such as social services, housing or economic development, individual contacts tend to be with both the central government – given the resources of central plans – and the local governments – in charge of service delivery. The action is however focused at the regional level and tends to individualize intergovernmental relations on an issue by issue basis as situational negotiations and bargaining prevail (Argullol *et al.* 2004).

Analysis of intergovernmental transformation

Various theories that were presented earlier expected that European integration would bind the central state and autonomous communities in the formulation and implementation of policy, particularly in those areas with higher degrees of Europeanization. Breaking with the belief that central governments were the most active “upstream” representatives with regard to policy making and regions were the “downstream” actors in implementation, this distinction was progressively eroded and regions took a more proactive role in defending the internal distribution of competencies and their rights to final decisions through reforms in their relations with the central government. As stated, a rather individualistic fashion ACs increased their international activity around EU participation and representation by opening lobbying offices in Brussels, attending the Committee of Regions and becoming involved in the Association of European Regions and other specialized associations dedicated to promote trans-frontier cooperation such as the Pyrenees – Mediterranean Euro-region or the Atlantic Arch (Closa and Heywood, 2004; MAP 2008d).

The question is whether, internally, this new regional stand changed the relationships among central and regional governments in the direction of more consultation, coordination and partnership leading to multilateral agreements. Did the EU make countries like Spain or Belgium closer to other federal European countries in the sense of increasing consultation of regions by the central government on major issues, increasing cooperation among regional governments and the development of new forms of cooperation of the second chamber with regional executives? There are a number of data and developments that are worth observing to evaluate the extent of this transformation.

a. Vertical relations/State-AACC

There is a quantitative increase in the number of “Sectoral Conferences” that reaches a maximum of 79 meetings in 2005 (Table 3). The average number of meetings in the last five years is around 65 (MAP 2008c). This has been the only instrument of multilateral cooperation until the creation of the Presidents Conference in 2004 and it can be interpreted as a sign of extension of vertical cooperation.

On the other hand, there is not a clear relation between the Europeanized character of a policy sectoral and the total number and frequency of the meetings (Table 1). Out of around thirty “sectoral conferences”, there is slightly more than one third that meets a minimum of twice every year. Less than half of those belong to a clearly Europeanized policy area - basically those dealing with agriculture, fishing, labor affairs and environment. Among the “sectoral conferences” meeting less often, various are dedicated to clearly Europeanized fields such as small and medium enterprises, transport, science, telecommunications, energy or infrastructures.

The cooperation is more frequent (Table 3) in those areas where autonomous communities have assumed more power and it is less frequent when the state has a situation of exclusive competence. In the case of “security” there is hardly any meeting since this is an exclusive competence of the state for all but two regions, where the relations with these two regions are highly bilateral. In contrast, in the area of social welfare policies - dependency and social services, employment, universities, health, education - the central government promotes specific programs with money transfers that have to be implemented by autonomous communities and local governments.

Table 1 Sectoral conferences dynamism

Conference name	Year of creation	Total number of meetings	Average number of meetings / year
Agriculture EU Policy	2000	74	9,25
Fishing EU Policy	2000	44	5,5
Dependency	2007	5	5
Agriculture & Rural Dev.	1983	123	4,9
Universities	1981	116	4,3
Labor affairs	1998	36	3,6
Health	1987	81	3,2
Education	1988	52	2,6
Relations with EU	1988	50	2,5
Fishing	1994	35	2,5
Fiscal Policy	1981	65	2,4
Social affairs	1990	38	2,1
Environment	1988	40	2
Women	1996	21	1,7
Justice	1999	15	1,6
Housing	1987	26	1,2
Small/Medium Enterprises	1997	13	1,1
Consumption	1987	25	1,1
Local affairs	2006	2	1
Culture	1992	16	1
Telecommunications	2006	2	1
Commerce	1995	12	0,9
Drugs	1986	21	0,9
Public administration	2003	4	0,8
Tourism	1984	17	0,7
Transportation	1988	12	0,6
Science and Technology	2006	1	0,5
Industry and Energy	1993	8	0,5
Security	2006	1	0,5
Infrastructures	1993	4	0,2

Source of data: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations

The distribution of powers also determines the kind of cooperation that develops in multilateral sectoral conferences. According to official reports on the agendas of the meetings (MAP 2008c) it is possible to distinguish between three basic categories. The most common is the transfer of money downward from the centre to regional governments – and often from them to municipalities and other agents – with a set of fiscal and program reporting requirements. This can be “European” funds as in agriculture, fishing, and employment, or central government funds as in dependency

and social services, universities, health or education. According to Table 3 these are the areas that celebrate a higher number of meetings. The second most common activity for “sectoral conferences” is the presentation and discussion of a “national plan” with regard to social problems that have a national dimension but where regions also have the formal authority to develop their own plans (e.g. research, development and innovation, domestic violence, settlement of immigrants). The third type of activity that may develop in “sectoral conferences” is the discussion of new legislation proposed by the central government in areas where the new regulations will rely on regional and local governments to be the implementers (e.g. dependency aid to families).

As a consequence of the increasing number of meetings, there is an increasing number of interactions between administrative officials working out the details and procedures of new policies set by the central government through new legislation and plans. The representation of autonomous communities in sectoral conferences takes place at the level of general directors, program heads and other staff. Higher level political representatives (regional ministers) do not attend the conferences. The Basque Country is the regional government with a highest level of absenteeism in sectoral conferences which is no doubt explained in great measure by their preference for bilateral instruments and their decreased reliance on state funds given its “special” system of finance where it retains a largest share of the taxes they collect for the central government.

Part of this activity takes place in areas of the exclusive competence of regions (e.g. dependency, housing, culture, tourism) and part of it takes place in areas of shared competence (e.g. education and health). But the central government does not use the

“sectoral conferences” for the discussion of major reforms and new legislation in areas of its exclusive competence (e.g. security and terrorism) or when it has the power to regulate “basic” legislation (e.g. general law of education). The conflict over the extension of “basic legislation” is resolved through political negotiations between political parties or, eventually, by the Constitutional Court.

An alternative way to look at Europeanization would be to see whether the 2004 reform which gave the Spanish autonomous communities the possibility to participate in the EU Council has had an effect on the frequency of meetings of the corresponding “sectoral conferences” (MAP 2008a). The reform associated the different formations of the European Council with the internal “sectoral conferences” that are responsible to choose the regional representative who will attend the European Council and the position he or she is supposed to defend. As seen in Table 4, the “sectorals” that have seen a higher dynamism, increasing the frequency of meetings since 2004 are “Dependency” – social policy of aid to families with “dependent” members - and “Fiscal Policy” two issues that have been in the centre of the internal political debate. The shaded cells show the sectoral conferences that are associated to various formations of the European Council. While there appears to be a very slight increase in these meetings, there is no clear pattern and, with the exception of the environment sectoral conference, the increase is not always significant since the number of meetings continues to be quite low in some notable cases, for example culture and consumption.

Table 4 Sectoral conferences dynamism before and after reforms

Conference name	# meetings since creation	# meetings per year until 2004	# meetings per year 2005-2007	Variation #meetings
Dependency	5	-	5	5
Fiscal Policy	65	2,1	4,6	2,5

Environment	40	1,7	3,6	1,9
Fishing EU Policy	44	4,8	6,6	1,8
Culture	16	0,7	2	1,3
Agriculture EU Policy	74	8,8	10	1,2
Agriculture Rural Dev.	123	6	7	1
Consumption	25	1	2	1
Local affairs	2	-	1	1
Telecommunications	2	-	1	1
Housing	26	1,1	2	0,9
Labor affairs	36	3,4	4	0,6
Justice	15	1,5	2	0,5
Drugs	21	0,8	1,3	0,5
Public Administration	4	0,5	1	0,5
Science & Tech	1	-	0,5	0,5
Security	1	-	0,5	0,5
Tourism	17	0,6	1	0,4
Health	81	3,8	4	0,2
Infrastructures	4	0,2	0,3	0,1
Education	52	2,7	2,6	-0,1
EU Affairs	50	2,7	2,5	-0,2
Small/Medium Enterprises	13	1,2	1	-0,2
Industry and Energy	8	0,5	0,3	-0,2
Transportation	12	0,6	0,3	-0,3
Women	21	1,6	2	-0,4
Commerce	12	1	0,6	-0,4
Fishing	35	2,6	2	-0,6
Social affairs	38	2,2	1,6	-0,6
Universities	116	4,3	3,6	-0,7

Source of data: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations

Moreover, sectoral conferences do not produce multilateral but bilateral agreements. According to the data of the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration, from 1981 to 2004, there were roughly 12 multilateral agreements or less than 0.5 per year for all the conferences. By contrast, bilateral agreements often follow one model which is basically the same for all the autonomous communities. There were 8,191 bilateral agreements, contracts or “*convenios*” between the state and individual autonomous communities in the period 1999-2007, about 910 agreements per year. The number of agreements increased significantly in 2006 at 1,360 per year. Agreements are increasingly used to channel central government spending through regional programs -

24,344 M€ from 1999 to 2007, according to the Ministry of Public Administration (2008b). This is therefore one of the main instruments of negotiation between the state and the regions. These type of agreements cover all kinds of subject matter, from stem cells (Xavier is this the translation?) to the information society. Bilateral agreements are extensively regulated by both the state and the autonomous communities and they are published in the official journal.

As mentioned, some autonomous communities like Canarias, Catalonia and the Basque Country have created bilateral commissions for the discussion of European Affairs. The “new generation” of autonomy statutes which started with the one of Catalonia in 2006 includes a new “Bilateral Commission of Cooperation” which the previous generation of statutes did not mention. The new statutes of at least six communities – Andalucía, Asturias, Galicia, Aragón, Navarra, Castilla y León - follow the same model providing evidence of the difficulty that both the state and the regions have to abandon the bilateral debates and relations in front of the possibility of other more general instruments of participation.

b. Horizontal relations among autonomous communities

There is not a clear evidence of increased cooperation among regional governments independently from the central government, save a few exceptions. On the other hand there has not been any reform with the aim of developing new forms of cooperation of the second chamber with regional executives.

It was the international activity of Spanish regions which gave them an opportunity to meet without the presence of the central government given the lack of a forum for their relations in the Spanish context. As a consequence of the participation of regions in European affairs, Spanish regional offices in Brussels have developed cooperative links in their activities, by themselves or through the Spanish permanent representation. (e.g. the region of Madrid is the leader of a core group looking at European employment policies while Catalonia leads a similar group in charge of immigration policy). Autonomous communities also work together in setting meetings with EU Commission representatives, members of the European Parliament and other experts.

Cooperation internally through bilateral or multilateral conferences among autonomous communities without the state has not developed. This is a characteristic that clearly differentiated the Spanish case from other European federal states which did not change. There is not a reaction to the centralization processes associated to EU membership along those lines and, even the Presidents' Conference, which in European federal countries is a formation of state presidents with no federal intervention (Hrbek 1999; Jeffery 1999), in the case of Spain, was promoted by the central government and follows a vertical logic. The Presidents' Conference celebrates a meeting once every year since 2004. It was created as a symbol of unity and multilateral dialogue among the state and the seventeen autonomous communities. Presidents of regions where the PSOE is not governing including the Basque Country (whose president appeared at the first meeting for the group picture only) despised the meeting as purely formal. It is too early to tell how necessary or useful it is, but for the moment it is perceived in symbolic

terms more than as an instrument that may compensate for the Senate as a chamber of very limited participation by autonomous communities in central decision making.

Conferences like the Swiss “Conference of Cantonal Executives” or the “Conferences of Cantonal Directors” (Bolleyer, 2006) have not developed in Spain. The asymmetry between nationalities and regions regarding powers and financing has been an obstacle to the formation of this kind of egalitarian meeting. Indeed, differences in regional fiscal balances - the difference between the contribution of each autonomous community through taxes and the return in public investment and public services - are becoming the main obstacle to any regional multilateral dialogue.

There have not been any agreements including three or more autonomous communities and the number of bilateral agreements as mentioned is less than 20, the majority between neighboring regions on forest fires and health assistance for the patients of one region in the hospitals of the other (García *et al.* 2006). Looking at those agreements one by one, it is possible to detect a few that were not developed as the “Agreement for the cooperation of the Autonomous Communities in the Mediterranean Arch”. There is no cooperation for economic development in the way the some Spanish regions pursue in European regional associations. There is not cultural cooperation among autonomous communities with a common language like in the case of Catalonia, Balears and Valencia. Only some regional public enterprises, as media corporations, have signed contracts concerning television rights.

The participation of autonomous communities in some formations of the EU Council has created the need to reach a common position but the usual procedure is the

distribution of a document which only in five occasions was discussed in a specific meeting of regional representatives (cite here?). The development of horizontal relations among autonomous communities before the meeting with the state to decide the Spanish position in the EU Council can be seen as an impact of Europeanization on internal institutions. However, this effect is not very significant given the size and nature of the meetings.

Finally, party ideology is also an obstacle to interregional cooperation. There is a basic confrontation between PSOE, PP and nationalist and regionalist parties but PSOE and PP regional governments also position themselves depending on which party has the control of the central government. On the other hand, fiscal imbalances tend to group regions differently. The coalition of regions having a positive fiscal balance is stronger than the coalition of regions with a negative fiscal balance, depending on their bilateral relations with the central government. The region of Madrid, for example, benefits from having the capital while Catalonia or Baleares have had cooperation difficulties in the past due to party differences.

Conclusions

The main question of this article was to what extent does membership in the EU change a country's intergovernmental relations and whether those changes tend to make federalizing countries like Spain more similar to other European federal countries in their pattern of relations between various levels of government. Our position is straight forward. Any analysis of Europeanization's effects on a country must not look at EU influence along but also that of the countries tradition of intergovernmental relations.

Using Spain as our case, we see a pattern somewhat different from other European federal countries, one where bilateralism prevails. The analysis shows that there are interesting organizational and IGR changes in the interface with the EU which cannot be denied but that it is more difficult to see great change in the domestic polity in the sense that EU policy leads to major of penetration of the Spanish national system of governance and overall shift in internal institutional relations.

The main reforms in the management of European affairs show a progression in the Spanish case. The regional involvement in European affairs started with creation of a multilateral conference with the central government in 1989, it followed with the agreement to encourage the discussion of European affairs in the corresponding “sectoral conferences” in 1994, after, with the legislative reform of the Conference for European Affairs in 1997 which opened up the possibility for autonomous communities to be represented in the Spanish delegation participating in EU Commission committees, and, with the extension of that participation to four formations of the EU Council in 2004.

Along with this process, Spanish institutions have learned to share power with less conflict, if this is measured by the frequency of their appeals to the Constitutional Court and the quantitative increase in the number of multilateral meetings involving the central government and the seventeen autonomous communities. For the first time, the need to reach a common position before representatives of the autonomous communities attend the EU Council has provided the justification for a few meetings involving the autonomous communities without the presence of the state.

However, basic patterns of relationships have not changed. The individualistic style is still predominant and political conflict is resolved through bilateral vertical bargaining. There is not progress in two basic directions that are essential to determine whether the federalizing case is closer to the federal preexisting models: first, autonomous communities do not work together if it is not without the impulse (particularly funding) of the central government; and second, the central government does not submit projects of its exclusive competence to the discussion of autonomous communities in the context of “sectoral conferences.”

Autonomous communities seem to be going from the “horizontal indifference” to the open political conflict because of financial differences in fiscal balances and party ideology. There is a basic division between PP-PSOE regions on one side and historic nationalities on the other side. But both sides tend to fragment depending on the position of those regions and nationalities with respect to their fiscal balance with the state. The same is true politically. For example, in Galicia, which is another historic region, the nationalist *Blogue Nacionalista Galego* abandoned any European pretenses by the time their state of autonomy was renegotiated in 2005: “Instead the bilateral distribution political power between the Spanish state and Galician political institutions became the predominant frame of reference for the party’s arguments in favor of greater political autonomy (Elias 2008: 576).

As a consequence of these three main tendencies, there are no multilateral agreements among autonomous communities and the number of horizontal bilateral agreements among them, in more than twenty five years is very low. This figure does

not admit comparison with the number of bilateral agreements between the central government and each of the autonomous communities.

Cooperation on European affairs depends completely on the initiative of the central government, which is interested in developing plans and actions in areas of shared power or regional exclusive competence. It seems to work best when there is money to be subvented. This is a way for the state to keep its influence in the autonomic sphere more than an opportunity for the autonomous communities to participate in the central decision making process. The financial cooperation with the state, as in the case of social services and dependency aid, explains that autonomous communities participate in central initiatives that may restrain their powers. As a result, contextual political factors like Europeanization do not appear to substantially change the style of intergovernmental relations. The change induced by Europeanization is weak compared with the strength of those more essential political battles. In the mainstream of Spanish government, domestic politics appears to trump EU influences.

Bibliographic references

- Agranoff, R. 1993. "Intergovernmental Politics and Policy: Building Federal Arrangements in Spain," *Regional Politics and Policy*, 3(2): 1-28.
- _____. 1996. "Federal Evolution in Spain." *International Political Science Review* 17(4) (October): 385-402.
- _____. 1999. "Intergovernmental Relations and the Management of Asymmetry in Federal Spain." In R. Agranoff (ed.), *Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- _____. 2004. "Autonomy, Devolution, and Intergovernmental Relations." *Regional and Federal Studies* 14(1) (Spring): 26-65.
- _____. 2007. "Local Governments in Spain's Multilevel Arrangements." In H. Lazar and C. Leuprecht (eds.), *Spheres of Governance: Cooperative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems*. Montreal and Kingston: Queen's University Press.
- _____. 2009. "Toward an Emergent Theory of IGR Governance at the Dawn of the Network Era." In E. Ongaro, A. Massey, M. Holzer and E. Wayenberg (eds.), *Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States*. Houndsmill: Edward Elgar.

- _____. Forthcoming. *Local Governments in Intergovernmental Relations in Federalizing Spain*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Agranoff, R. and J.A. Ramos. 1997. Towards Federal Democracy in Spain, An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations, *Publius*, 27(4): 1-38.
- Aja, E. 1999. *El Estado Autonómico*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial. Revised edition of 2003.
- Alda, M. 2006. “Los planes y programas conjuntos como instrumentos de cooperación intergubernamental.” En L. Lopez (coords.), *Relaciones intergubernamentales en la España democrática*. Madrid: Dykinson.
- Argullol, E. et al. 2004. *Federalismo y Autonomía*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel.
- Ballart, X. and C. Ramió. 2000. *Ciencia de la Administración*, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch.
- Bel, G. and A. Costas. 2006. “Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization in Spain.” *Journal of Policy Reform* 9(1): 1-24.
- Blanco, I. y Goma R. 2002. “Proximidad y participación: marco conceptual y presentación de experiencias.” En I. Blanco y R. Goma (coords.), *Gobierno locales y redes participativas*. Barcelona: Ariel.

- Bolleyer, N. 2006. "Intergovernmental Arrangements in Spanish and Swiss Federalism: The Impact of Power-Concentrating and Power-Sharing Executives on Intergovernmental Institutionalization." *Regional and Federal Studies*, 16(4): 385-408.
- Börzel, T. 1999. "Towards convergence? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(4): 573-596.
- Börzel, T. 2000. "From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism. The Europeanization of the Spanish State of Autonomies," *Publius*, 30(2): 17-42.
- Börzel, T. 2002. *States and Regions in the European Union. Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bulmer, S. 2007. "Theorizing Europeanization." In P. Graziano and M. P. Vink, *Europeanization, New Research Agendas*, Palgrave.
- Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds.). 2005. *The Member States of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CARCE, 2004. "Acuerdo sobre la Participación Autonómica en el Ámbito del Consejo de la UE", Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas de 9 de Diciembre de 2004.
- Carr, R. and J.P. Fusi. 1981. *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Closa C. and P. Heywood. 2004. *Spain and the European Union*. New York: Palgrave.

Colino, C. 2001. “La integración europea y el estado autonómico: Europeización, intergubernamentales.” En C. Closa (ed.), *La Europeización del sistema político Español*. Madrid: Istmo.

_____. 2007. “La acción internacional de las comunidades autónomas y su participación en la política exterior española,” papel de trabajo, OPEX Observatorio.

Colomer, J.M. 1998. “The Spanish ‘State of Autonomies:’ Neo-institutional federalism,” *West European Politics*, 21:4, 40-52.

Cowles, M. G., J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds.). 2001. *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Elias, A. 2008. “From Euro-enthusiasm to Euro-scepticism? A Re-evaluation of Minority Nationalist Party Attitudes Toward European Integration.” *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18(5 October): 557-581.

Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (eds.). 2003. *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Font, R., R. Gutiérrez, and S. Parrado. 1999. "Intergovernmental Partnerships at the Local Level in Spain: *Mancomunidades* and *Consortia* in a Comparative Perspective." Paris: OECD (PUMA/RD(99) 41 Final).
- García, C. 1995. "The Autonomous Communities and External Relations." In Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathon Story (eds.), *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*. London: Routledge.
- García, M.J. 2006. "Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autónomo." En M.J. García, J. Montilla and X. Arbós. *Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autónomo*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- García, M., J. Montilla and X. Arbós. 2006. *Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autónomo*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- González, A. 2006. "La cooperación multilateral institucionalizada: las conferencias sectoriales." En Lourdes López (coord.), *Relaciones intergubernamentales en la España democrática*. Madrid: Dickenson.
- Grau, M. 2001. "Spain incomplete federalism," in U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt, *Federalism and Political Performance*, Routledge.
- Graziano, P. and M. P. Vink. 2007. *Europeanization, New Research Agendas*. Palgrave.

- Hrbek, R. 1999. "The Effects of EU Integration on German Federalism." In C. Jeffery, (ed.), *Recasting German Federalism: The Legacy of Unification*. London: Pinter.
- Jeffery, C. 1999. "From Cooperative Federalism to the 'Sinatra Doctrine' of the Länder?" In C. Jeffery (ed.), *Recasting German Federalism: The Legacy of Unification*. London: Pinter.
- Jiménez, F. 1999. "Political Scandals and Political Responsibility in Democratic Spain." In P. Heywood (ed.), *Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain*. London: Frank Cass.
- Jones, R. 1997. "Regional Participation in Spanish European Policy: Implications for the Level of State Autonomy." Madrid: Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, Working Papers on European Studies.
- Kincaid, J. 1991. "The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal Democracy." In D. A. Kenyon and J. Kincaid (eds.) *Competition Among States and Local Governments*, Washington DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Kohler-Koch, B. 1996. "Catching up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 3(3): 359-380.
- Kohler-Koch, B. and R. Eising (eds.). 1999. *The Transformation of Governance*. London: Routledge.

Krane, D. and D. S. Wright. 1998. "Intergovernmental Relations." In Jay M. Schafritz (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

López-Aranguren, E. 2002. *Relaciones Intergubernamentales en los Estados Autonómico y Federal*. Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública.

Loughlin, J. 2000. "Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe," *Regional and Federal Studies*, vol. 10-2: 10-32.

MAP 2008a. "Informe sobre la Participación de las CCAA en el Consejo de la UE 2007," Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, Secretaria de Estado de Cooperación Territorial.

MAP 2008b. "Informe sobre los convenios de colaboración Estado-Comunidades Autónomas suscritos durante 2007," Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, Secretaria de Estado de Cooperación Territorial.

MAP 2008c. "Informe sobre la Actividad de las Conferencias Sectoriales durante 2007," Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, Secretaria de Estado de Cooperación Territorial.

MAP 2008d. “La Cooperación Transfronteriza realizada por las entidades territoriales españolas.” Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, Secretaria de Estado de Cooperación Territorial.

Maiz, R., P. Beramendi, M. Grau. 2002. “La federalización del Estado de las Autonomías. Evolución y Déficit Institucionales.” En J. Subirats and R. Gallego (eds.), *Veinte Años de Autonomías en España*. Madrid: CIS, 324-379.

Marks, G., L. Hoogue and K. Blank. 1996. “European Integration from the 1980s.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(3): 341-378.

Márquez, G. 2007. *Política y gobiernolocal*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.

Moravcsik, A. 1994. “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation.” Center for European Studies. Working Paper Series, Harvard University, No. 52.

Moreno, L. 2001. *The Federalization of Spain*. London: Frank Cass.

Olsen, J. 2002. The Many Faces of Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(5): 921-952.

O’Toole, L. 1997. “Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research Based Agendas in Public Administration: *Public Administration Review* 57(1): 45-52.

Risse, T, M.G. Cowles and J. Caporaso. 2001. "Europeanization and Domestic Change." In M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sandholtz, W. 1996. "Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(3): 403-429.

Wiarda, Howard J. 1993. *Politics in Iberia*. New York: Harper Collins.